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Abstract:  Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on bank margins has dealt solely with 
interest margins. Applying the seminal Ho-Saunders model (JFQA, 1981) to a multi-output 
framework, we show that the relationship between bank margins and market power (controlling 
for risk) varies significantly across bank specializations. Using a set of both accounting margins 
and New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) margins, we find that market power rises 
significantly with output diversification towards non-traditional activities. These results 
contribute to explain the paradoxical coexistence of decreasing interest margins and higher 
market power found in previous studies (93 words). 
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 Most of the theoretical and empirical models of bank margins behavior have focused 
only on interest margins. Nevertheless, due to the increasing importance of non-traditional 
activities in bank revenues, it seems to be necessary to extend the framework of the analysis by 
incorporating broader definitions of bank margins. The seminal model of Ho and Saunders 
(1981) has been the reference framework for most empirical analyses on the determinants of 
bank (interest) margins. Lerner (1981) discussed the Ho-Saunders model and already suggested 
that the insights that arise from recognising that a (multi-output) production function exists 
would require a more comprehensive analysis of bank margins. Several contributions of the so-
called “New Empirical Industrial Organization” (NEIO) also indicate that there are potential 
estimation biases associated with the use of accounting margins and, in particular, when using 
firm-level data and multi-output production technologies (Schmalensee, 1989, p.961; 
Bresnahan, 1989, p.1013). In this context, Shaffer (2004) shows that price to marginal costs 
margins should be employed in order to test bank conduct directly and to compare these with 
the outcomes obtained using accounting margins. Recent contributions have also shown that 
there is a coexistence of decreasing interest margins and higher market power in several 
European financial systems (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004). 
Specialization/diversification patterns may explain, at least partially, these paradoxical trends. 
 This article analyses the relationship between bank margins –using both accounting and 
NEIO margins- and output diversification in European banking during 1994-2001. The study is 
divided in four sections following this introduction. The theoretical setting and the background 
of previous studies are shown in Section 2. Section 3 describes the methodology and data of an 
empirical analysis on a sample of seven European countries: Germany, Spain, France, 
Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden. Section 4 offers the main results of the 






2. Bank margins and specialization 
 2.1. Theoretical setting 
 The seminal Ho-Saunders model relies solely on pure intermediation activities 
(deposits-taking and lending). In order to show the impact of diversification towards non-
traditional activities a multi-product framework is employed. In the Ho-Saunders model, the 
spread is the difference between lending and deposits rates ( −L Dr r ) that equals the provision of 
immediacy of liquidity services (a+b). Our model is adopted from Allen (1988), who applied 
her analysis to two types of loans. We modify the Allen model to assume that bank portfolio is 
composed of loans (L) and non traditional assets (N) –such as earning assets different from 
loans and other fee income activities- along with deposits (D). In our multi-product framework, 
banks have two alternatives: (i) they may set prices on loans relative to deposits so that 
immediacy fees are Lb  and a, respectively; (ii) they may also set prices on non-traditional 
activities relative to deposits rates so that non-traditional and immediacy fees are, respectively, 
Nb  and a. Therefore, the interest margin will equal a+ Lb  and the gross margin will be 
a+ Lb + Nb
3. Using Taylor expansion series to obtain the expected bank utility wealth (U(w)) as 
in the Ho-Saunders model, the first order conditions yield the intermediation margin: 
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Since our model includes fee-income activities, It is also possible to compute the gross margin 
as: 
 2 23 3 1 2( ) 1 2
2 4 4
N
L N I L N I
L
a b b R Q b b R Qδα σ σ
β β δ
  
+ + = + + + + −  
  
         [2]  
                                                 
3 As in the Ho-Saunders model, all product transaction sizes are equal to the same transaction size, Q, for 
all customers and the fees (a, bL , and bN ) are assumed to remain fixed over time. The deposit supply, the 
loan demand and the non-traditional business demand are assumed to be linear functions. The key 
element that determines risk in traditional activities is the stochastic arrival of a loan relative to deposits 
demand. In the multi-output perspective, non-traditional activities are presented as an alternative to loans 




where ''/ '≡ −R U U  is a measure of absolute risk aversion. α
β
 is the ratio of the intercept (α ) 
and the slope ( β ) of the symmetric deposit, loan and non-traditional output arrival functions of 
the bank. As this ratio increases, banks may enjoy higher monopoly power. If 
[ ] 22 ( / ) 1δ δ σ+ −N N L Ib R Q <0 in [2], the introduction of non-traditional activities reduces interest 
margins. Non-traditional activities alter market power by changing both α  and β . Similarly, 
the difference between intermediation and gross margins will also depend on changes in the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient (R) and on the cross-elasticities of demand across bank 
products (δ N  and δ L ). 
  
2.1. Empirical applications: review and reassessment  
 Two main approaches have been followed in the analysis of bank (interest) margins: the 
(static) micro-model of the banking firm (Zarruck, 1989; Wong, 1997) and the (dynamic) 
intermediation/dealership approach (Ho and Saunders, 1981). Both models follow an Industrial 
Organization (IO) perspective and analyse the effects of risk and market structure on interest 
margins. These models are empirically implemented by including variables that proxy 
competitive conditions and risk. Several studies have also included different sources of (interest, 
liquidity and credit) risk, as well as the influence of factors such as solvency regulations or 
operating efficiency (Angbazo, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher; 2000; Maudos and Fernandez 
de Guevara, 2004). The reduced-form empirical equation that explains interest margins 
(INTMG) in these models can be described as: 
 INTMGit = f(Sit(.), Xit, εit)              [3]      
where Sit(.) is a vector of the determinants of the pure spread (market power and risk variables), 
Xit(.) is a vector of other bank-specific variables (efficiency, solvency) and εit is the error term. 
As opposed to equation [3], in the empirical analysis of the determinants of bank 
margins within a multi-output (broad banking) environment, the issue of 
specialization/diversification plays an important role. Changes in bank production technologies 
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may affect both the pure spread (market structure and risk) parameters as well as other variables 
that proxy the competitive behaviour of banks (such as efficiency). Therefore, we extend the 
reduced-form empirical equation shown in [3] to incorporate the effects of 
specialization/diversification options beyond lending and deposit-taking: 
 MGit = f(Sit(.), Xit, SDit, OCit, εit)            [4] 
MGit is a bank margin definition in a broad sense (not only interest margins but also direct 
margins such as the Lerner index);  Sit(.) is a vector of the determinants of the pure spread 
(market power and risk variables); Xit(.) is a vector of other bank-specific variables (efficiency, 
solvency); SDit, is a vector of bank output specialization/diversification strategies showing the 
structure of bank’s assets portfolio; OCit, is a vector of other control variables such as changes 
in economic activity or in regulation; and εit  is the error term. Other bank-specific factors (Xit), 
such as efficiency and solvency, can also affect banks’ income structure significantly. However, 
the relationship between operating efficiency and margins remains unclear. On one hand, 
specialization may imply higher operating efficiency (driven by a reduction in transaction 
costs). This may result in lower margins if banks reduce prices along with costs (Rogers and 
Sinkey, 1999; Siems and Clark, 1997). On the other hand, as noted by Maudos and Fernandez 
de Guevara (2004) for the European banking system, specialized banks exhibit higher unit costs 
on average so that margins and efficiency may be lower with specialization. Regulatory 
pressures on capital have been found to represent a premium on bank prices and to widen 
margins (Angbazo, 1997; Wong, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). 
The innovative vector in the equation of bank margins is SDit, which states for output 
technology specialization/diversification variables. As shown above, we expect a close 
relationship between business and income diversification levels.  
Finally, the vector OCit refers to other control variables such as economic conditions or 
regulation. Changes in business cycle and different degrees of liberalization may result in 
significant differences on bank margins across countries and regions (Jayaratne and 




3. Empirical methodology and data 
An empirical analysis is undertaken for a representative sample of banks from seven 
European countries –Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden- 
during 1994-2001. The aim is to estimate the determinants of bank margins employing a 
traditional measure of interest margins (the loan to deposits rate spread), a wider accounting 
margin (gross income) and a broader measure of bank margins following the NEIO perspective 
(the Lerner index).  
Our theoretical model follows a dynamic approach where banks need to match the 
random deposit supply function and the random demand of lending and non-traditional 
activities across periods. The maximization of bank wealth considers both initial and end-of-
period information. Therefore, endogeneity may affect bank margins significantly. The 
empirical implementation of the reduced-form equation in [4] results in: 
 MGit = MGit-1+ Sit(.) + Xit, + SDit + OCit + µi + εit           [5] 
where MGit states, alternatively, for the loan to deposit rate spread (SPREAD) –as a pure 
intermediation margin-, the gross income (GROSS)-which incorporates non-interest income and 
non-interest expense to intermediation margins- and the Lerner index (LERNER) –as a broader 
banking margin and a measure of market power. Endogeneity is considered since margins in 
period t-1 (MGit-1) are expected to affect margins in period t. The vectors of the determinants of 
the pure spread Sit(.); other bank-specific factors (Xit); output technology 
specialization/diversification variables (SDit,); and other macroeconomic environment control 
variables (OCit) are also included, while µi is the individual unobservable effect. The definition 
of the variables and data sources are shown in Table 1. Endogeneity requires a simultaneous 
equations estimation framework. In order to avoid estimation bias with panel data and dynamic 
variables, we follow the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM procedure. Two simultaneous 
equations are estimated, one with first-differenced variables and another one in levels: 
, , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
 arg  arg (  arg  arg )
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 The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM procedure requires the use of appropriate 
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instruments. The instruments for the equations in differences are the one-lagged explanatory 
(including the lagged dependent) variables. The lagged first-differenced explanatory variables 
are the appropriate instruments for the equations in levels. Country-specific dummies were also 
included to account for unobservable effects across countries. Although there might be 
correlation between the explanatory variables in levels and the individual effects, these effects 
are not necessarily correlated with the first-differenced variables, A Sargan test for restrictions 
overidentifcation is employed. The null hypothesis in this test is that the instrumental variables 
and the residuals are not correlated. 
 The sample consists of 19.322 European banks (annual observations) from Germany, 
Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden using Bureau Van Dijk-
Bankscope database information between 1994 and 2001. These countries are selected in order 
to analyze bank margins in market-based and bank-based financial systems. In our sample, 
Germany, Spain, France and Italy are considered as bank-based systems while Netherlands, 
United Kingdom and Sweden are catalogued as market-based systems. The classification is 
consistent with recent surveys on comparative financial systems such as Barth et al. (2000). 
Sample composition is shown in Table 2. The panel is unbalanced due to mergers and 
acquisitions during the period. The summary statistics –mean and standard deviation by 
country- of the posited variables are presented in Table 3. 
  
4. Main results: determinants of accounting margins and NEIO margins 
 The results of the estimations where the loan to deposits rate spread (SPREAD) is the 
dependent variable are shown in the first column of Table 4. The lagged SPREAD variable in 
the right-hand-side is positive and significant, showing the relevance of accounting for 
endogenity in these equations. As for the determinants of pure spreads, the HHI does not seem 
to be significantly related to SPREAD. This is in line with recent evidence that has found that 
margins and concentration are not necessarily positively related and that interest margins may 
be even lower in more concentrated markets (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). However, both 
liquidity and interest rate risk measures are found to augment loan to deposits rate spreads 
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significantly. Operating inefficiency is also positively and significantly related to the loan to 
deposits rate spreads since banks with higher costs apparently tend to operate with higher 
margins. As predicted, the capital to assets ratio –which is also positively and significantly 
related to interest margins- represents a premium on bank margins due to pressures of solvency 
regulations on bank lending activities. 
 As for the specialization/diversification variables, the coefficient of the ratio “loans to 
total assets” is negatively and significantly related to SPREAD, suggesting that those banks 
specialized in lending can offer lower bank margins (higher efficiency). However, deposit-
taking specialization seems to augment spreads. This behaviour supports the hypothesis of a 
loss-leader behavior in traditional intermediation activities with banks assuming higher costs on 
deposits and compensating it with higher interest margins or larger loan transactions. Regarding 
non-traditional activities, the relative weight of other earning assets is found to affect SPREAD 
positively which, in turn, indicates that more diversified banks operate with higher interest 
margins in lending/deposit-taking activities compared to specialized banks. However, 
innovations related to traditional activities- such as loan commitments- are found to be 
positively and significantly related to loan to deposits rate spreads, suggesting that lending 
relationships may permit banks to operate with higher interest margins and compensate this with 
fees from other activities such as credit cards or lines of credit. The ratio “ATM/branches” is 
also positively and significantly related to spread showing a positive effect of technical change 
on bank interest margins. As for the effect of the evolution of GDP, banks are found to reduce 
interest margins during the upturns following the evolution of market interest rates. The 
empirical evidence also reveals that SPREAD tends to be larger in bank-based systems 
compared to market-based systems. 
 The second column in Table 4 employs the loan to interbank market rate spread 
(LMSPR) as a robustness check for the effects of diversification on interest margins. This 
variable permits to analyze pricing behaviour relative to market rates. The results are clearly in 
line with those obtained when SPREAD was the dependent variable. Moreover, these results 
support the hypothesis of cross-sectional risk sharing against intertemporal rate smoothing in 
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European banking since LMSPR is found to shrink when GDP increases (Allen and Gale, 1994 
and 1996; Berlin and Mester, 1999;  Allen and Santomero, 2001). These results remain quite 
similar when taking the GDP variable in second- or third-differences, which suggests that cross-
sectional risk sharing behaviour persists over time4. 
 The results where gross income over total assets (GROSS) is the dependent variable are 
shown in the third column of Table 4. The goodness of fit is poorer in these regressions, which, 
in turn, reflects the information problems related to the use of accounting margins. Put 
differently, as accounting margins become wider, the identification of the sources of market 
power and risk –in terms of bank specialization- become more difficult. In any event, it is worth 
noting that the only variables that are statistically significant and positively related to GROSS 
among the specialization parameters are the ratio of other earning assets to total assets, the fee-
based activities indicator and the ATMs/braches ratio. This suggests that specialization towards 
non-traditional activities tend to increase gross margins. In any event, and due to the problems 
with accounting measures and the poor economic significant of the equations where GROSS is 
the dependent variable, we employ a relative margin from the NEIO (the Lerner index) to study 
the effects of non-traditional activities on bank margins. 
The forth column in Table 4 shows the results when a direct measure of banks margins -
the Lerner index- is the dependent variable. First of all, the concentration variable (HHI) is not 
found to affect LERNER significantly, a result that is in line with Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevara (2004). However, liquidity and interest rate risk and the capital to assets ratio are 
significantly and positively related to LERNER. Interestingly the estimated coefficients are 
found to be lower than in the case of SPREAD which, in turn, suggests a reduction of risk 
effects on margins with diversification.  
                                                 
4 There are two main macroeconomic hypotheses related to banks’ margins that affect aggregate risk in 
financial markets. The first one is the hypothesis of cross-sectional risk sharing, which states that 
intermediaries transfer risk from certain agents to others although aggregate risk do not change. The 
alternative hypothesis is the so-called intertemporal risk smoothing, which states that banks may benefit 
from long-term relationships when households’ portfolios are not so dynamic and most of the financial 
savings are invested in deposits. Banks may then take advantage of their relatively large liquidity 
holdings to offer lower rates on loans during downturns and compensate this with higher loan rates –
relative to market rates- during upturns.  
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As opposed to the case of SPREAD, a higher ratio of loans to total assets seems to be 
positively and significantly related to LERNER, while market power decreases with a higher 
level of deposits over total liabilities. This result supports the hypothesis of loss-leader behavior 
in intermediation activities since the negative effect of deposits specialization on bank margins 
can potentially be compensated with higher market power in lending activities. Other variables 
such as the weight of other earning assets (different from loans), the variable that relates the 
Boyd-Gertler estimator to total assets, the level of loan commitments and the relative 
substitution of branches for ATMs are also positively and significantly related to LERNER. 
These results are not surprising, since all these variables represent higher income from fees 
resulting from innovations. Overall, European banks have apparently found new sources of 
market power in fee-earning activities tend to face the increasing competition in traditional 
business. Therefore, as shown in equations [1] and [2], diversification towards non-traditional 
products may rise bank margins by increasing market power. Interestingly, bank-based systems 
are found to exhibit higher LERNER indices compared to market-based countries.  
Since prices and marginal costs may be affected differently by technical change, interest 
rates, the business cycle and other macroeconomic influences, the numerator of this index, 
defined as the mark-up between prices and marginal costs (MRKUP) was also included as an 
additional dependent variable in Table 4 5. The results are clearly in line with those obtained 
using LERNER as the dependent variable. 
 According to the previous results, a tentative interpretation is the existence of, at least, 
two different playing fields in European banks’ margin strategies. First of all, although 
competition has increased in traditional activities –with interest margins falling in recent years- 
banks apparently can take advantage of deposits to enjoy higher loan interest margins (loss-
leader behavior). At a second stage, those banks that diversify their assets portfolio to a larger 
                                                 
5 The mark-up is built as a fraction of bank total assets in order to obtain a relative margin directly 
comparable with the rest of dependent variables. 
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extent may also benefit from the lower level of competition –higher market power- in fee-
earning activities6.  
 All the equations were also estimated by country. A summary of the results obtained for 
the specialization/diversification variables -including the signs of the coefficients and their 
statistical significance- are shown in Table 5. All the results are in line with those obtained for 




This study analyses the relationship between bank margins and specialization. Using a 
multi-output model were prices on loans, deposits and other non-traditional activities are set 
simultaneously, we find that both market power and risk parameters alter bank margins when 
introducing financial innovations. Empirical tests are implemented for a sample of European 
19.322 banks -from Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden- 
to analyse the determinants of bank margins during 1994-2001. The loan to deposit rate spread 
and the loan to interbank market rate spread –as conventional approaches to bank margins-, the 
gross income –as a wider accounting margin- and the mark-up of price over marginal costs and 
the Lerner index –as more direct and broader measures of banks margins- are employed as 
dependent variables. The results suggest that specialization and bank margins are significantly 
related although these relationships can be only observed when considering a broader definition 
of bank margins (the Lerner index). Output diversification permits banks to increase their 
revenues and obtain higher market power. In particular, non-interest (fee) income may 
“compensate”, somehow, lower interest margins that result from stronger competition in 
traditional markets. These results explain, at least partially, the paradoxical coexistence of 
decreasing interest margins and higher market power in European banking sectors found in 
previous studies.  
                                                 
6 Additionally, due to the fact that German banks account for almost 60% of the number of observations, 
we also undertook the same empirical analysis removing the German institutions from the sample for 




Table 1. Variable definition and data sources 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
SPREAD Loan to deposits rate spread. As the difference between the price of loans –computed as the ratio “interest 
income/loans” and the price of deposits –computed as the ratio “interest expense/deposits”. 
LMSPR Is the spread between bank loan rates and the interbank market (three months) rate. 
GROSS Gross income over total assets. This ratio incorporates non-interest income and non-interest expenses to 
intermediation margins to that non-traditional output is reflected in this accounting margin. 
MRKUP  
LERNER The ratio “(price of total assets-marginal costs)/price of total assets. The price of total assets is computed as the ratio 
“total (interest and non-interest) revenue/(total assets+off-balance sheet activities ”. Marginal costs are estimated 
using a single output (for the sum of total assets and off balance sheet activities) translog cost function with three 
inputs (deposits, labor and physical capital). 
 
DETERMINANTS OF THE PURE SPREAD (Sit(.)) 
HHI A Herfindhal-Hirschman index computed from banks total assets in national markets. According to the traditional 
SCP hypothesis, concentration and banks margins will be positively related. However, this relationship may be 
influenced by third variables and margins can be found to be negatively affected by concentration (see, for example, 
Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). 
Liquidity risk As a proxy for liquidity risk we employ the ratio “liquid assets/short term funding”. Liquidity risk is expected to 
affect bank margins positively (Angbazo, 1997). 
Interest rate risk Computed as the difference between the interbank market (three months) rate and the interest rate of customer 
deposits. Interest risk increases bank interest margins (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). 
 
OTHER BANK-SPECIFIC FACTORS (Xit(.)) 
Inefficiency Computed as the ratio “operating costs/gross income”. Higher operating inefficiency imply higher operating costs. 
Therefore, we expect that those banks experiencing higher costs will increase prices to a larger extent, so that 
inefficiency will result in higher margins. 
Capital to assets ratio A proxy of banks’ solvency computed as the ratio “capital and reserves/total assets”. Capital requirements represent 
a premium on bank margins (Berger, 1995). Therefore, a positive relationship between this variable and bank 
margins is expected. 
 
SPECIALIZATION DIVERSIFICATION VARABALES (SDit(.)) 
Lending/total assets Customer and interbank loans as a ratio of total assets. As specialization in traditional activities increases, efficiency 
on these activities may increase and banks might exhibit lower (interest) margins. 
Deposits/total 
liabilities 
Total deposits as a ratio of total liabilities. As shown previously, the relationship between deposits-taking 
specialization and bank margins may be either negative –if deposits are not a loss-leader product- or positive –if 
deposits are loss-leader products that permit to operate with larger interest margins. 
Other earning 
assets/total assets 
Total earning assets different from loans as a ratio of total assets. Contrarily to the loan to assets ratio, a higher 
value of this ratio will imply a higher diversification towards fee-income and/or market-based activities. Therefore, 




Total loan commitments (credit cards and lines of credit) as a ratio of total assets. Although these activities are 
considered as non-traditional, they represent an off-balance sheet expansion of lending activities. Therefore, as the 
level of loan commitments increases, the specialization/efficiency effect on lending activities will be larger and 
interest margins will be expected to fall. 
Fee-based activities 
(Boyd-Gertler 
estimator as a ratio of 
total assets) 
The Boyd and Gertler (1994) estimator is a proxy of bank fee-based activities which is directly comparable with 
balance sheet assets. It is computed as [ ]( ).fee income total revenue-fee income  total  bank assets . Higher 
levels of fee-income activities will represent higher income diversification towards non-traditional activities. Higher 
market power is associated with fee-based activities and, as a result, an increase of bank margins will also be 
expected. 
 
ATMs/branches A proxy of technical change in delivery channels. The ratio is computed using national data on banks’ ATMs and 
branches. As this variable grows, banks are expected to reduce their unit operating costs and increase fee-income 
from the use of these services. 
 
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT CONTROL VARIABLES (OCit(.)) 
GDP GDP, in constant 1995 US dollars. The relationship between bank margins and growth will depend on the 
correlation between prices, costs and the business cycle. Economic growth is negatively related to bank prices and 
costs although the extent to which these variables can be affected may be significantly different so that the net effect 
on margins cannot be clearly determined (Carbo et al., 2003). 
BBMB A dummy indicating if the bank operate in a bank-based or market-based system, This dummy aims to provide a 
preliminary evidence of potential differences in bank margins according to financial system structure. The dummy 
take the value 1 if the bank operates in a bank-based system and 0 if the bank operates in a market-based system. 
Germany, Spain, France and Italy were labelled as bank-based systems while Netherlands, United Kingdom and 
Sweden were considered as market-based systems . 
Note: All the variables were computed using Bureau Van Dijk-Bankscope database information except interbank market rates (International 
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund), ATMs and branches (Blue Book, European Central Bank) and GDP (World Development 





Table 2. Sample composition by country and year 
 
 TOTAL FRANCE GERMANY ITALY NETHERLANDS SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
1994 2098 345 1265 216 36 148 14 74 
1995 2284 350 1372 244 47 153 18 100 
1996 2434 350 1445 262 51 186 19 121 
1997 2512 345 1476 296 49 200 17 129 
1998 2549 337 1508 314 46 191 20 133 
1999 2579 372 1480 343 48 183 24 129 
2000 2541 361 1440 362 42 179 25 132 
2001 2325 335 1288 345 33 181 25 118 
PERIOD 19322 2795 11274 2382 352 1421 162 936 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics: means of the posited variables by country 
 (standard deviation in parenthesis) 
Variable GERMANY SPAIN FRANCE NETHERLANDS ITALY UNITED KINGDOM SWEDEN 











































































































































































































Gertler estimator as a ratio 































































Table 4. Determinants of bank margins and specialization: a dynamic panel approach 
Total sample (Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden) 
N. observations: 19322 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis (GMM estimator) 
standard errors in parenthesis 






























































































































































F-test 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.001 0.001 
Sargan test 0.010 0.011 0.022 0.010 0.009 
 
* Significantly different from zero at 5 per cent level. 




Table 5. Determinants of bank margins and specialization across countries: summary of results 
N. observations: 19322 




















branches F-test Sargan test 
         
Germany         
SPREAD -- ++ -- ++ 0 ++ 0.001 0.010 
LMSPR -- + -- ++ 0 ++ 0.002 0.012 
GROSS 0 ++ ++ 0 + 0 0.007 0.020 
MRKUP 0 - + 0 ++ ++ 0.001 0.010 
LERNER 0 -- + 0 ++ ++ 0.001 0.009 
         
Spain         
SPREAD -- ++ - ++ 0 + 0.001 0.011 
LMSPR - + - ++ 0 + 0.004 0.014 
GROSS 0 + ++ 0 ++ 0 0.005 0.018 
MRKUP + - + 0 ++ + 0.002 0.008 
LERNER 0 -- ++ 0 ++ ++ 0.001 0.010 
         
France         
SPREAD -- + -- ++ 0 ++ 0.001 0.009 
LMSPR - ++ -- ++ 0 ++ 0.003 0.011 
GROSS 0 ++ ++ 0 + 0 0.006 0.020 
MRKUP 0 - + 0 ++ ++ 0.003 0.012 
LERNER 0 - + 0 ++ + 0.002 0.013 
         
Netherlands         
SPREAD - + -- + 0 + 0.005 0.012 
LMSPR 0 + - ++ 0 + 0.006 0.013 
GROSS 0 + ++ 0 + 0 0.008 0.021 
MRKUP 0 - + 0 ++ ++ 0.002 0.012 
LERNER + - + 0 ++ + 0.003 0.011 
         
Italy         
SPREAD -- + -- ++ 0 ++ 0.006 0.011 
LMSPR - ++ -- ++ 0 ++ 0.007 0.014 
GROSS 0 ++ + 0 ++ 0 0.005 0.016 
MRKUP 0 - + 0 ++ + 0.002 0.011 
LERNER 0 -- + 0 + ++ 0.002 0.010 
         
United Kingdom         
SPREAD - + -- + 0 + 0.006 0.012 
LMSPR 0 + - ++ 0 ++ 0.004 0.020 
GROSS 0 ++ ++ 0 + 0 0.007 0.020 
MRKUP + 0 + 0 + ++ 0.004 0.016 
LERNER 0 - 0 0 ++ ++ 0.003 0.014 
         
Sweden         
SPREAD 0 + - ++ 0 + 0.004 0.011 
LMSPR - ++ -- + 0 + 0.003 0.015 
GROSS 0 + ++ 0 + 0 0.008 0.020 
MRKUP + - + 0 + ++ 0.004 0.014 
LERNER 0 - 0 0 ++ ++ 0.003 0.012 
         
The following signs indicate that the estimated coefficient was: 
+: positive and significant at 5 per cent level 
++: positive and significant at 1 per cent level 
-: negative and significant at 5 per cent level 
--: positive and significant at 1 per cent level 
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